Fog computing extends the cloud computing to the network edge and allows deploying a new type of semioffline services, which can provide real-time transactions between two entities, while the central cloud server is offline and network edge devices are online.
Introduction
Fog computing was initially introduced by Cisco, which can overcome cloud computing's disadvantages, such as nonreal-time service and long delay [1] [2] [3] . More specifically, fog computing adds a new layer between cloud server and terminal user [4, 5] ; that is, fog servers can be access point, base station, router, or mobile equipment [6] [7] [8] [9] . Thus, the semioffline e-payment system can be deployed by utilizing the advantages of fog computing model [10, 11] .
In order to defend user's privacy in offline e-payment system, blind signature (BS) is crucial for that it never permits signer to sign on a plaintext before knowing its content [12] . Therefore, BS can protect user privacy during the transactions [13] instead of encrypting the data and searching on the ciphertext [14] . However, this system is deployed in real environment; it will use distributed architecture [15] . The original signer should authorize an agent to sign for himself. Then a proxy signature (PS) should be used in e-payment system, since proxy signer can satisfy this requirement [16] .
Combining those two types of schemes together, a new proxy blind signature (PBS) was proposed, which meets the properties of those two signature schemes. After that, many PBS schemes were constructed by scholars.
However, most of the PBS schemes are based on number theory, such as discrete logarithm problem (DLP) and bilinear pairings. These schemes are considered to be insecure to resist the quantum computer attack. Therefore, the e-payment and e-voting systems in the cloud still face the threat from quantum computer attack [17] . Meanwhile, these schemes need to rely on complex public key infrastructure (PKI) [18, 19] . In conclusion, these schemes based on number theorem cannot defeat the quantum computers attack according to the recent research results.
Therefore, the lattice-based PBS schemes become one alternative solution, since they are sufficient enough and able to resist quantum computer attack [20, 21] . Besides, if lattice-based PBS schemes can combine with identitybased cryptography (called IDPBS), they can overcome the shortcomings of traditional PBS schemes, such as relying on 2 Wireless Communications and Mobile Computing complex PKI [22] . Meanwhile, they can transfer less data than biological recognition methods during the transactions [23, 24] .
Zhu et al. presented a new lattice-based BS [20] , which can be secure enough for cloud services. However, this scheme has to be combined with proxy signature in practice. Combining BS scheme and IDPS scheme, we initially present an IDPBS on number theorem research unit lattice (IDPBS-NTRU), which can defeat quantum computer attack.
(1) Inspired by [25] , a new IDPBS-NTRU scheme is proposed based on NTRU lattice, which can make semioffline e-payment and e-voting systems deployed in fog computing model secure enough to resist quantum computer attack.
(2) The proposed IDPBS-NTRU scheme is proven to be secure. That is, the proposed scheme is correct, blind, unforgeable, verifiable, strong identifiable, strong undeniable, and key-dependent.
(3) The proposed IDPBS-NTRU is compared with the existing IDPBS schemes in terms of performances. The result shows that it outperforms the ZM scheme except in proxy signer's signing key size, and it is more secure than TA and MMHP schemes.
The paper is introduced as follows. Section 2 introduces the background knowledge about NTRU lattice and main key technology. Section 3 introduces the security model for IDPBS. Section 4 shows that the proposed IDPBS is proven to be secure and it is compared with other IDPBS schemes in terms of performances. At last, Section 5 draws the conclusions.
Related Works
IDPBS Schemes Based on DLP. In 2011, Beura et al. proposed a new proxy blind signature based on DLP; their scheme satisfies the properties of blind signature and proxy signature. This scheme is more secure and efficient than factoring signature schemes [26] . To improve the efficiency, Tan et al. introduced a couple of PBS schemes; both of them were constructed on Schnorr blind signature. However, Sun et al. pointed that both of them were not unforgeable and unlinkable [27] . However, in 2014, Wang and Liao proved that the schemes proposed by Oo et al. and Beura et al. did not satisfy unlinkability [28] . In 2013, Tan proposed a PBS based on DLP, which did not depend on PKI [29] and was proven to be secure in the random oracle [30] . However, most of these schemes are dependent on PKI and are not strictly proven to be secure.
IDPBS Schemes Based on Bilinear
Pairings. In 2003, Zhang et al. proposed a new proxy blind signature based on bilinear pairings, which satisfies distinguishability, verifiability, strong nonforgeability, strong identifiability, strong nondeniability, and prevention of misuse. Meanwhile, this scheme did not depend on public key infrastructure (PKI) [31] . Later, Li et al. introduced a new PBS, which was also constructed on bilinear pairings; it was independent of PKI [32] . However, these schemes are inefficient and are not proven to be secure.
IDPBS Schemes Based on Lattice.
In 2014, Zhang and Ma initially proposed a proxy blind signature on lattice; it does not need to depend on PKI; its security is based on short integer solution problem. However, this scheme is still inefficient. [33] .
Preliminaries
In the beginning, we will define the denotations that will be used all over the paper in Denotations.
NTRU Lattice and Rejection Sampling on Lattice
Definition 1 (NTRU lattice). The notations are defined as , ∈ R and ℎ = −1 mod ; after that, the NTRU lattice can be defined as
That is, L ℎ, is on behalf of a R 2 full-rank lattice whose basis is ( −T (ℎ) I I O ), I denotes a unit matrix, O denotes a null matrix, and T (ℎ) denotes an anticirculant matrix
Definition 2 ( -,1,2, on NTRU lattice). Small and can be sampled from Z , ( , mod ∈ R × ); then
and ℎ = −1 can be obtained by using Algorithm 3 in [25] . Therefore, R-SIS on NTRU means finding
Theorem 3 (rejection sampling theorem).
denotes one subset of Z , the norms of 's elements are less than constant , = ( √log ) ∈ R, (M is invariable), and ℎ : → R is a probability distribution. Two algorithms are as follows: One is
, 1) .
The other is
get (w, k) with probability 1 .
(2)
Then the distribution of first algorithm will not exceed the second one's statistical distance 2 − (log ) / . Moreover, The first one will export something with probability at least (1 − 2 − (log ) )/ .
The Definitions of IDPBS
Scheme. An IDPBS consists of seven algorithms ( , , ,
:
( , ) → Proxy Verify:
( O , P , , , , ) → / Algorithm 1: General IDPBS scheme. [12, 36, 37] . TTP will execute (1 ) to produce public parameters and keys [29, 38, 39] . The formal definition is presented as follows (Algorithm 1):
(1 ) outputs and = ( , ).
(ii) ( , , ) outputs for O and P ( = O or P).
(iii) ( , , ) outputs for P.
(iv) Proxy blind signature: U interacts with P according to the following protocol:
(1) ( , ): U blinds to by using and then sends to P. (2) ( , , , , ): P signs on using and sends the signature to U.
(3)
( , ): U unblinds by using and outputs the blind signature .
(v) ( , , , , , ): if , are valid, the algorithm outputs true. Otherwise it outputs false.
An IDPBS scheme should meet the following six properties. The details can be seen in [20, 33, [40] [41] [42] .
(1) Blindness.
* are denoted as an adversary who can control the proxy signer.
* chooses two messages 0 and 1 . Then a random bit ∈ {0, 1} is chosen in the game. 0 and 1 are randomly denoted as and 1− . These two messages are, respectively, used as two user's inputs. After that, * will adaptively and parallelly interact with two honest users according to the signature protocol. Finally, two users output and 1− respectively. Then and 1− ordered by and 1− are delivered to * ; after that, * will output ∈ {0, 1}.
(2) One More Unforgeability. P can generate a legal proxy instead of O. However, O and all the other entities fail to generate a legal signature. The game is presented as follows [33] : V * , the advantage of * , is denoted as success probability in Algorithm 3. If no adversary can win Algorithm 3 at minimum with negligible probability in time , then it satisfies one more unforgeability [31] .
(3) Verifiability. V can check whether is delegated by O.
(4) Strong Identifiability. Any V can determine P's identity once he receives the proxy signature tuple.
(5) Strong Undeniability. P cannot refuse to admit it once he creates the proxy signature .
(6) Key Dependence. P can sign on a message if and only if he has the authorization from O.
Proposed IDPBS-NTRU Scheme
Here, we introduce a novel IDPBS-NTRU = ( , , ,
, which can be seen in Algorithm 4. The details are as follows.
(1)
(1 ). = Poly( ), ∈ (0, ln / ln ), and
can be obtained as below [25] . The algorithm takes samples and from Z , . Here, , mod ∉ R × , ‖ ‖, ‖ ‖ ≤ √ , and ⟨ , ⟩ ∈ R. After that, the algorithm can get 1 , 1 ∈ R according to the equation 
(2) ( , , msk). The algorithm executes (4) to get an -dimension matrix t; then the algorithm executes (6) and outputs according to corresponding ( = O, P) [25] .
(5)
. is denoted as a warrant. O will execute this algorithm to generate a valid delegation.
(i) The algorithm chooses y 1 , y 2 ∈ Z , at random.
(ii) The algorithm executes (6) to get an -dimension matrix u.
(iii) The algorithm executes (7) and (8) (iv) O sends ( 1 , 2 , u, ) to P.
. is a plaintext. U will execute this algorithm to generate a blind message, which needs to be signed by P.
(i) The algorithm will randomly select y 3 , y 4 , , ∈ Z , . (ii) The algorithm executes (9) to get an -dimension e.
(iii) The algorithm executes (10) to blind e.
(iv) U sends (y 3 , y 4 , e * ) to a proxy signer P.
. The proxy signer P will execute this algorithm to sign on the blinded message.
(i) The algorithm validates whether (11) and (12) are true.
If either is false, P aborts the algorithm. Otherwise, it continues.
(ii) The algorithm will execute (13) and (14) . Here, the rejection sample theory is used to keep the proxy signatures 3 and 4 independent on P's secret keys s P 1 and s P 2 .
(iii) The algorithm outputs the tuple ( , , 1 , 2 , u, 3 ,
4 , e).
(6) . U will execute the algorithm to unblind the proxy signature.
(i) The algorithm executes (15) to unblind the proxy signature tuple. (ii) U outputs the signature tuple ( 1 , m, 2 , , u, 3 , 4 , e). ( 1 , , 2 , , u, 3 , 4 , e, O , P ). V will execute this algorithm to validate whether the signature tuple satisfies (16) . If all the equations mentioned above are true, the signatures are valid. Otherwise, they are invalid.
Security and Performance Comparison

Security (1)
Theorem 4 (correctness). The IDPBS-NTRU scheme is correct.
Proof. According to the construction of our IDPBS scheme, we can get
Therefore, 2 (ℎ * 2 + 1 − ( O ) * u, ) = u.
= ℎ ( * 4 + ) + * 3 + − ( P ) * e = ℎ (y 4 + P 2 e * + ) + y 3 + + P 1 e * − ( P ) * e = y 3 + ℎy 4 + ℎ + − 1 ( P ) .
(18)
Thus, 3 (ℎ 4 + 3 − 1 ( P )e, ) = e.
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is the successful interaction number between U * and P return true iff ̸ = for 1 ≤ < ≤ and ( , , ) = 1 and + 1 = Algorithm 3: Expt U * ( ).
(2)
Theorem 5 (blindness). The IDPBS-NTRU scheme satisfies blindness.
Proof. As shown in Algorithm 2, A random bit ∈ {0, 1} which is kept secret from * . Then * chooses two messages 0 and 1 . 0 and 1 are randomly denoted as and 1− . and 1− are the inputs of two honest users, respectively. * adaptively and parallelly interacts with two honest users, respectively. Finally, these two honest users output and 1− , respectively. The sequence and 1− ordered by and 1− will be sent to * . * will output a bit ∈ {0, 1}. In the process of signature protocol, all intermediate results do not depend on ; thus it is enough to analyze e * , y 3 , y 4 , 1 , 2 , u, , * 3 , and * 4 . To e * , the statistical distance is presented as follows:
Pr (e * = e * ) − Pr (e * 1− = e * ) .
Since is chosen at random, next we obtain the equations Pr(e * = e * ) = 1/2 and Pr(e * 1− = e * ) = 1/2. Therefore, we obtain Δ(e * , e * 1− ) = 0. In the same way, we can obtain Δ(y 3 , y can be solved by Θ with probability at least
Proof. We suppose that Γ is able to generate an IDPBS signature successfully with ; we are able to construct Θ to calculate -'s solution. The interaction environment can be simulated as follows.
Setup. Θ selects ℎ ∈ R × and 1 , 2 , and 3 at random. Next Θ calculates and delivers = {ℎ, 1 , 2 , , , } to Γ.
Queries on 1 Oracle. To reply to 1 oracle's query, Θ creates one null list 1 . Once Θ obtains one , Θ will query 1 . If there is a consistent with the query, Θ will return . Otherwise, Θ will select a random . At last, Θ will return to Γ and save ( , ) to 1 .
Queries on 2 Oracle. To reply to 2 's queries, Θ creates a list 2 ; is initialized null. When Θ receives an (y 1 , y 2 , ), Θ will query 2 . If there is one corresponding value , Θ will return u . Else Θ will choose one u at random. Finally, Θ will return u to Γ and save (y
Oracle Queries. When Θ queries a private key related to one , Γ will recover the corresponding ( , ) from
to Θ and save the tuple to 3 .
Oracle Queries. When Θ requests the delegation queries, Θ will verify whether has been queried for 1 or oracle. If it has been queried, Θ will obtain ( , , ) from 3 . Else Θ will simulate oracle and get a new private key. Next Θ will execute ( After that, we begin to analyze Θ's advantages. As mentioned above, Θ will win this game if Γ has already forged a valid (
, e ) and (
). The simulation of the oracle fails if 2 causes inconformity. Then Θ is able to solve -,1,2, with probability at minimum = ((1−2 − (log ) ) ) can confirm P's identity in accordance with P ; thus the IDPBS-NTRU scheme satisfies strong identifiability.
(6) Strong Undeniability. 3 and 4 are signed by using P's secret keys P 1 and P 2 ; they will only be known by P; thus P cannot refuse his signature once he signed; thus the IDPBS-NTRU scheme satisfies strong undeniability. [33] , the parameters satisfy ≥ 2 lg and > log . In TA [34] and MMHP [35] schemes, the security parameter is equal to .
In Table 1 , we compute the signature size and signing key size for O and P. It is clear to draw a conclusion that our proxy signer's OSS, OSK, and PSK are smaller than ZM, TA, and MMHP schemes, our PSS is larger than ZM scheme, our PSS is smaller than TA scheme and MMHP scheme, and our OSS, OSK, PSK, and PSS are larger than TA and MMHP schemes. However, TA scheme and MMHP scheme are based on DLP; they are considered as not secure to resist the quantum computer attack. So our scheme can be more secure than them.
Conclusions
In this work, we present an IDPBS-NTRU scheme by using NTRU lattice; this scheme plays an important role in offline e-payment system, which can be deployed in fog computing model. We demonstrate that IDPBS-NTRU is efficient and secure. In addition, our IDPBS-NTRU's OSS, OSK, and PSK are smaller than ZM scheme and safer than TA and MMHP schemes. The proposed scheme is constructed based on NTRU lattice, which has the advantages of NTRU lattice. In the future, we will continue to construct a partial IDPBS scheme based on lattice.
Denotations
O:
Originalsigner P:
Proxysigner U: Auser V: Acertifier : Trustedthirdparty : System parameters : Masterkey :
Masterpublic-key : Mastersecret-key :
User's identity : Secret key related to a user : W a r r a n t :
A m e s s a g e :
A blinded message :
A blind factor : D e l e g a t i o n :
Blind signature A polynomial function related to :
A n a d v e r s a r y :
A c h a l l e n g e r :
A c o n s t a n t :
Security parameter.
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